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OCCUPY WALL STREET AND
ANTITRUST
MAURICE E. STUCKE t

I. INTRODUCTION
Even its more stalwart defenders are concerned that capitalism is in
crisis.1 Alan Greenspan conceded a "flaw" in his free-market beliefs.2 The
FinancialTimes, in 2012, invited Arundhati Roy and Occupy Wall Street
to share a dialogue with high-level officials and leading economists over
the crisis in capitalism. 3
The crisis in capitalism might have come as a shock to some, but not
to many middle- and lower-income households. Well before 2008, middleclass Americans saw little gains in income, despite gains in productivity.4
*

Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law; Senior Fellow, American
Antitrust Institute. The author wishes to thank Albert Foer, Don Leatherman, Frank Pasquale, Gregory
Stein, and Spencer Weber Waller for their helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., Joseph L. Bower, Herman B. Leonard & Lynne S. Paine, Global Capitalism at
Risk: What Are You Doing About It?, HARv. Bus. REv., Sept. 2011, at 106; Joseph L. Bower, Herman
B. Leonard & Lynne S. Paine, Op-Ed., Occupy Wall Street ProtestorsHave a Point, HARV. Bus. SCH.

WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 15, 2012), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6956.html?wknews=02152012
("[Occupy Wall Street] concerns are not very different from the concerns [authors] heard when [they]
talked to business leaders around the world about the problems they thought might constitute material
threats to the sustainability of market capitalism."); Frank Kane, CapitalismCrisis a Big Partof Davos
Forum, THE NAT'L, Jan. 25, 2012, http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/industryinsights/economics/capitalism-crisis-a-big-part-of-davos-forum. In one recent survey, Republicans
reacted most positively to "capitalism" (62 percent reacting positively; 29 percent reacting negatively),
when compared with independents (52 percent reacting positively; 39 percent negatively), Democrats
(47 percent reacting positively; 43 percent negatively), and Americans younger than thirty (43 percent
reacting positively; 48 percent reacting negatively). "Socialism " Not So Negative, "Capitalism" Not So
Positive: A Political Rhetoric Test, PEW RESEARCH CTR., May 4, 2010, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/

1583/political-rhetoric-capitalism-socialism-militia-family-values-states-rights.
2.

Kara Scannell & Sudeep Reddy, Greenspan Admits Errors to Hostile House Panel, WALL

ST. J., Oct. 24, 2008, at Al, availableat http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122476545437862295.html.
3. See In Depth-Capitalism in Crisis, FIN. TIMES, http://www.ft.com/indepth/capitalism-incrisis (last visited Nov. 7, 2012).
4. Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez., Top Incomes in the Long Run of
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shrank further.5

America's social net, U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders described in his historic
speech, is threadbare. 6 America's infrastructure is crumbling. 7 Primary and
secondary education for many families is inadequate. 8 Incarcerations, 9
home foreclosures, 10 underwater mortgages," the number of people in
History, 49 J. ECON. LITERATURE 3, 8 (2011) (noting how "U.S. real income per family grew at a

modest 1.2 percent annual rate from 1976 to 2007" but "when excluding the top 1 percent, the average
real income of the bottom 99 percent grew at an annual rate of only 0.6 percent, which implies that the

top 1 percent captured 58 percent of real economic growth per family during that period").
5.
See generally SEAN F. REARDON & KENDRA BISCHOFF, US2010 PROJECT, GROWTH IN THE
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION OF FAMILIES BY INCOME, 1970-2009 (2011) (reporting a shrinking middle
class and a decrease in economically-mixed neighborhoods); Marisol Bello & Paul Overberg, Middle
Class' Share of the Nation's Income Is Shrinking, USA TODAY (Oct. 26, 2011),
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/story/2011-10-25/middle-class-disappearing/50914822/1.
6.

BERNIE SANDERS, THE SPEECH: A HISTORIC FILIBUSTER ON CORPORATE GREED AND THE

DECLINE OF OUR MIDDLE CLASS 72-73 (2011).
7.
Id. at 40-41, 129-35, 236; ARIANNA HUFFINGTON, THIRD WORLD AMERICA: How OUR
POLITICIANS ARE ABANDONING THE MIDDLE CLASS AND BETRAYING THE AMERICAN DREAM 94-101

(2011); Report Card for America's Infrastructure, AM.
http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2012).
8.

ORG.

FOR

ECON.

CO-OPERATION

&

DEV.,

STRONG

SOC'Y

OF

PERFORMERS

CIVIL
AND

ENG'RS,

SUCCESSFUL

REFORMERS IN EDUCATION: LESSONS FROM PISA FOR THE UNITED STATES 32-34 (2011), available at

http://www.oecd.org/pisa/46623978.pdf ("[S]ocio-economic disadvantage has a particularly strong
impact on student performance in the United States: 17% of the variation in student performance in the

United States is explained by students' socio-economic background," which is significantly higher than
9 percent in Canada or Japan: "In other words, in the United States, two students from a different socioeconomic background vary much more in their learning outcomes than is normally the case in OECD
countries."); SANDERS, supra note 6, at 136-42; Martha J. Bailey & Susan M. Dynarski, Gains and
Gaps: Changing Inequality in U.S. College Entry and Completion 5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,

Working Paper No. 17633, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl7633 (finding, from
nearly seventy years of U.S. Census data, a growing gap between children from high- and low-income
families in college entry, persistence, and graduation).
9.

ACLU, BANKING ON BONDAGE:

PRIVATE PRISONS AND MASS INCARCERATION 5 (2011),

available
at
http://www.aclu.org/prisoners-rights/banking-bondage-private-prisons-and-massincarceration ("The United States imprisons more people-both per capita and in absolute terms-than

any other nation in the world, including Russia, China, and Iran.").
10.

SYLVIA A.

ALLEGRETTO, ECON. POLICY INST.,

THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA'S

WEALTH, 2011, at 30-31 (2011), http://www.epi.org/publication/the state of working americas
wealth 2011/; Kara Bloomgarden-Smoke, What's Next for Occupy Wall Street? Activists Target
Foreclosure Crisis, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 29, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/2012/0129/What-s-next-for-Occupy-Wall-Street-Activists-target-foreclosure-crisis;
Alejandro
Lazo, Mortgage Delinquency Rate Falls, but the Number of Homes in Foreclosure Last Quarter
Remained at Record Levels, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011, at B2.
11.
ALLEGRETTO, supra note 10, at 29-30; Paul Owens, 46 Percent of Homes in South Florida
Underwater - Mortgages, SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Aug. 10, 2011, at 1A ("46 percent of
homes with mortgages in Palm Beach, Broward and Miami-Dade counties are worth less than what's
owed .... Nationally, about 27 percent of homes with mortgages are underwater."); The American
Cities Sunk by Underwater Mortgages, 24/7 WALL ST. MORNING NEWSLETTER, (Oct. 28, 2011, 3:38
AM), http://247wallst.com/2011/10/28/the-american-cities-sunk-by-underwater-mortgages/.
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poverty, 1 2 and the public's dissatisfaction with Congress are at record
highs. 13 With America's debt in the trillions of dollars, 14 a larger fiscal
crisis looms. Many Americans in 2012 were dissatisfied with the United
States' moral and ethical climate (68 percent surveyed), the federal
government's size and power (69 percent), and the state of America's
economy (83 percent). 15 Given the dissatisfaction, it is a wonder why more
people are not protesting.
One concern, which the Occupy Wall Street protesters and many
Americans share, is that
the current imbalance of power between mega-corporations and all other
institutions and individuals in the world constitutes a danger to peace,
health and prosperity. While the protesters in the Middle East rebel
against powerful repressive governments, participants in the Occupy
Wall Street protests share a perspective that a relatively small group of
corporate and wealthy individuals now wield too much economic
influence and control in the United States and the world. 16
The concern is that government policies are skewed toward helping
the wealthy and powerful.1 7 Many Americans for years believed there was
"too much power in the hands of a few rich people and large corporations
12. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C. SMITH, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 14

(2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/201 lpubs/p60-239.pdf ("The number of people in
poverty in 2010 (46.2 million) is the largest number in the 52 years for which poverty estimates have
been published."); DANILO TRISI, ARLOC SHERMAN & MATT BROADDUS, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, POVERTY RATE SECOND-HIGHEST IN 45 YEARS; RECORD NUMBERS LACKED HEALTH
INSURANCE, LIVED IN DEEP POVERTY 2 (2011), http://www.cbpp.org/files/9-14-1 lpov.pdf (noting that

in 2010, 20.5 million people, 6.7 percent of the U.S. population, "lived below half of the poverty line
(below $11,157 for a family of four)"-the highest level on record).
13.
Frustration with Congress Could Hurt Republican Incumbents-GOP Base Critical ofParty's
Washington
Leadership, PEW
RESEARCH
CTR.
(Dec.
15,
2011),
http://www.people[hereinafter
press.org/2011/12/15/section-3-views-of-national-economy-major-economic-threats/
Frustration with Congress].
14.
U.S. Nat'lDebt Clock, http://www.usdebtclock.org/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2012).
15.
Lydia Saad, U.S. Economy Most Toxic of 24 Issues, GALLUP POLITICS (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/152129/Economy-Toxic-Issues.aspx.
16.
Scott T. Meier, Imbalance of Power Imperils Prosperity, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 11, 2011, at
G2. See also DAVID ROTHKOPF, SUPERCLASS: THE GLOBAL POWER ELITE AND THE WORLD THEY ARE

MAKING (2009).
17.
SANDERS, supra note 6, at 23-24; Frustration with Congress, supra note 13 ("A 61%
majority say the economic system in this country unfairly favors the wealthy, while 36% say it is
generally fair to most Americans. And fully 77% say that a few rich people and corporations have too
much power in this country. While still a minority view, the current survey finds 40% saying that hard
work and determination are no guarantee of success, higher than in any other survey conducted over the
past 17 years.").
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in the United States."1 8 Sixty-one percent of Americans surveyed "say the
economic system in this country unfairly favors the wealthy."1 9 Many
believe the tax system favors the rich.2 0 Some wealthy taxpayers are also
dissatisfied with the tax inequities. 21 Fifty-six percent of surveyed

Americans said "the power and influence of banks and other financial
institutions represented a major threat to the country." 22 Over four hundred

economists support Occupy Wall Street in "liberat[ing] the economy from
the short-term greed of the rich and powerful one percent." 23 Students are
questioning a conservative bias in economics itself.24 As Robert J. Shiller

observed, "I teach financial markets, and it's a little like teaching R.O.T.C.
during the Vietnam War. You have this sense that something's amiss."25
So what does antitrust have to say about this public unease? The
Symposium raises many interesting issues for antitrust scholars. But few
will likely read the Supreme Court's Standard Oil Co. v. United StateS26
opinion handed down a century ago. Many popular antitrust casebooks
devote few pages to the case. 27 Few likely believe that the issues in
18.
Andrew Kohut, Op-Ed., Don 't Mind the Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2012, at
A27, available at http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/dont-mind-the-gap/.
19.
Id.
20.
Id.; SANDERS, supra note 6, at 26-27, 45-46, 75-76, 97 (noting that the "wealthiest 400
Americans now earn an average of $345 million a year and pay an effective tax rate of 16.6 percent, on

average," which is "the lowest tax rate for wealthy individuals on record").
21.
James B. Stewart, Common Sense: At 102%, His Tax Rate Takes the Cake, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
4, 2012, at B 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/business/at-102-his-tax-rate-takes-thecake-common-sense.html? r=1&scp=5&sq=stewart&st=cse.
22.
Frustration with Congress, supra note 13.
23.
Economists Statement in Support of Occupy Wall Street, ECON4, http://econ4.org/statementon-ows (last visited Nov. 7, 2012).
24.
See, e.g., Jose A. DelReal, Students Walk Out of Ec 10 in Solidarity with 'Occupy',
HARVARD CRIMSON, Nov. 2, 2011, available at http://www.thecrimson.harvard.edu/article/2011/11/2/
mankiw-walkout-economics-10/.
25.
Kevin Roose, Investment Banking at Top Colleges, Anti-Wall St. Fervor Complicates
Recruiting, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 28, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/28/at-topcolleges-anti-wall-st-fervor-complicates-recruiting/.

26.

Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).

27.

Many casebooks either briefly summarize the case or mention it in passing. See, e.g., PHILLIP

AREEDA & LOUIs KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 125-26, 369-70 (6th

ed. 2004); EINER ELHAUGE, UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 49, 52, 178, 309
(2008); ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAWS IN
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 90, 607 (2d ed. 2008);
ROBERT PITOFSKY, HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID & DIANE P. WOOD, TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND
ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: ANTITRUST (6th ed. 1985); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN

&

MATERIALS 25, 49-50, 58 (6th ed. 2010); LOUIs B. SCHWARTZ, JOHN J. FLYNN & HARRY FIRST, FREE
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS

25, 38, 188, 201, 238, 488, 657, 754, 827 (5th ed. 2003). One exception is ELEANOR M. Fox, U.S.
ANTITRUST IN GLOBAL CONTEXT: CASES AND MATERIALS 33-40 (3d ed. 2012).
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Standard Oil and this Symposium relate to their concerns. That is
unfortunate. As Margaret Levenstein observed,
In the one hundred years since the United States had the audacity to
break up Standard Oil, we have lost that confidence that we can shape
our own economic society, to make it serve the human beings (or the
environment) that should be the goal. Not just consumers, but humans,

who consume and produce and live in communities and dream and hope
and despair. 28

The concerns Standard Oil raised are salient today. At the forefront
then and now, as Part II discusses, are issues of income inequality and
crony capitalism. Part III discusses how antitrust policy lost its way during
the past thirty years; Part IV addresses several current antitrust paradoxes.
This Essay concludes with how Occupy Wall Street recaptures what others
have long known: competition and antitrust are more political than
economic concepts. 29
II. CONCERNS IN STANDARD OIL AND TODAY OVER INCOME
INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION
A. WEALTH INEQUALITY-THEN AND Now

A concern in Aristotle's time, 30 in 1890 (when the Sherman Act was
enacted), in 1950 (when the Clayton Act was amended), 3 1 and today 32 is
the destabilizing effect from extreme wealth inequality. In 1890, wealth
28.
29.

Margaret C. Levenstein, Antitrust and Business History, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 451, 455 (2012).
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID

STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 233 (2008).

30.
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE IV, at xi § 10 (R.F. Stalley ed., Ernest Barker
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) ("[T]he best form of political economy is one where power is vested in
the middle class, and, secondly, that good government is attainable in those states where there is a large
middle class-large enough ... [to] prevent either of the opposing extremes from becoming
dominant.").
31.
Senator Kefauver said,
I am not an alarmist, but the history of what has taken place in other nations where mergers
and concentrations have placed economic control in the hands of very few people is too clear
to pass over easily. A point is eventually reached, and we are rapidly reaching that point in
this country, where the public steps in to take over when concentration and monopoly gain too
much power. The taking over by the public through its government always follows one or two
methods and has one or two political results. It either results in a Fascist state or the
nationalization of industries and thereafter a Socialist or Communist state.
96 CONG. REC. 16,452 (1950).
32.
See, e.g., Zanny Minton-Bedoes, Special Report: The World Economy, For Richer, For

Poorer, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 2012, at 2 (discussing how growing inequality "is one of the biggest
social, economic and political challenges of our time").
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inequality was high.33 Senator Sherman identified this inequality of
condition, wealth, and opportunity as the greatest threat to disturbing social
order: this inequality "[had] grown within a single generation out of the
concentration of capital into vast combinations to control production and

trade and to break down competition." 34
As the majority and dissent in Standard Oil discussed, people were
concerned about wealth concentrated in the hands of a few individuals and
corporations. The legislative debates of the Sherman Act
conclusively show . . . that the main cause which led to the legislation
was the thought that it was required by the economic condition of the
times; that is, the vast accumulation of wealth in the hands of
corporations and individuals, the enormous development of corporate
organization, the facility for combination which such organizations
afforded, the fact that the facility was being used, and that combinations
known as trusts were being multiplied, and the widespread impression
that their power had been and would be exerted to oppress individuals
35
and injure the public generally.
Justice Harlan elaborated further,
All who recall the condition of the country in 1890 will remember that
there was everywhere, among the people generally, a deep feeling of
unrest. The nation had been rid of human slavery, -fortunately, as all now
feel,-but the conviction was universal that the country was in real danger
from another kind of slavery sought to be fastened on the American
people; namely, the slavery that would result from aggregations of
capital in the hands of a few individuals and corporations controlling, for
their own profit and advantage exclusively, the entire business of the
country, including the production and sale of the necessaries of life. Such
a danger was thought to be then imminent, and all felt that it must be met
firmly and by such statutory regulations as would adequately protect the
people against oppression and wrong....
Guided by these considerations, and to the end that the people, so far as
interstate commerce was concerned, might not be dominated by vast
combinations and monopolies, having power to advance their own
selfish ends, regardless of the general interests and welfare, Congress
passed the anti-trust act of 1890 . ... 36
33.
HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN
TRADITION 237-38 (1954) (citing CHARLES B. SPAHR, AN ESSAY ON THE PRESENT DISTRIBUTION OF
WEALTH 69 (1896)) (estimating that one-eighth of American families controlled nearly seven-eighths
of America's wealth).

34.
35.

21 CONG. REC. 2455, 2460 (1890).
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911).

36.

Id. at 83-84 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis omitted). See
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Economists have documented the distinctive "U" shape pattern of
income disparity between 1917 and 2007.37 Peaking in 1928, income
disparity sharply declined during the Great Depression. Thereafter,
"[b]etween 1947 and 1973, economic growth was both rapid and
distributed equally across income classes," reported the Economic Policy
Institute. 38 "The poorest 20% of families saw growth at least as fast as the
richest 20% of families, and everybody in between experienced similar
rates of income growth." 39 But in the late 1970s, income inequality in the
United States began growing, reaching a record high in 2007.40 As the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD")
noted,
The wealthiest Americans have collected the bulk of the past three
decades' income gains. The share of national income of the richest 1%
more than doubled between 1980 and 2008 . . . [while] the top marginal

income tax rate dropped from 70% in 1981 to 35% in 2010.41
Between 2002 and 2007 alone, "the top 1 percent captured over twothirds (65 percent) of income growth." 42 In 2010, the United States had the
fourth-highest income gap between the rich and poor among OECD nations
(trailing only Chile, Mexico, and Turkey).4 3 Although the disparity
between the rich and poor widened globally,4 4 the OECD observed,
"nowhere has this trend been so stark as in the United States." 45
at 206-07.
37.
Atkinson, Piketty & Saez, supra note 4, at 6; Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer. The
Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States (Updated with 2009 and 2010 Estimates) (Mar. 2, 2012),
http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/-saez/saez-Ustopincomes-2010.pdf.
38.
Economic
Policy
Institute,
Income
Inequality,
ST.
WORKING
AM.,
http://stateofworkingamerica.org/inequality/income-inequality/.
HOFSTADTER, supra note 29,

39.

Id.

40.
Atkinson, Piketty & Saez, supra note 4, at 6 (noting how the share of total pretax income
going to the top decile income group reached almost 50 percent by 2007, the highest level on record,
with a significant change in the top one percentile, which rose from 8.9 percent of total pretax income

in 1976 to 23.5 percent in 2007).
41.

Divided We Stand. Why Inequality Keeps Rising, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.

(Dec. 5, 2011), www.oecd.org/els/socialpoliciesanddata/49170253.pdf.
42.

Atkinson, Piketty & Saez, supra note 4, at 9. See also U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TRENDS

IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME BETWEEN 1979 AND 2007, at xi (2011).

43. Divided We Stand. Why Inequality Keeps Rising, supra note 41.
44. Angel Gurrfa, OECD Secretary-General, Remarks at Press Conference for Divided We
Stand:
Why
Inequality
Keeps
Rising
(Dec.
5,
2011),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/social/name,59278,en.htm ("Income inequality in OECD countries is at its highest
level for the past half century.").
45. Growing Unequal?. Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries, ORG. FOR ECON.
Co-OPERATION & DEV., at 1 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/2/41528678.pdf.

40
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Wealth inequality is also at a record high. 4 6 In 1962, "the wealthiest
1% of households

averaged

125

times

the

wealth

of the

median

household." 47 By 2009, the wealth disparity nearly doubled: "the wealthiest
1% of households averaged 225 times the wealth of the median
household." 48 Indeed, all households-except those in the top 5 percentsaw a relative decline in share of overall wealth between 1962 and 2009.49
In 2009, the richest 20 percent of American households accumulated 87.2
percent of household net wealth, the remaining 80 percent of American
households accounted for 12.8 percent of all wealth, and approximately one
in every four American households had no (or a negative) net worth.o
Americans can accept this inequality if they or their children can
become wealthy. But, contrary to this Horatio Alger belief, income
mobility is lower (and income inequality is greater) in America than in
many other developed countries.5 1 "Americans do not have an equal shot at

getting ahead, and one's chances are largely dependent on one's parents'
economic position," one 2008 study found. 52 "Children born to parents in
the top quintile have the highest likelihood of attaining the top, and
children born to parents in the bottom quintile have the highest likelihood

of being in the bottom themselves." 53 In the 1890s, the wealthy adopted a
robber-baron style. Today's wealthy are turning to "despot decor." 54 Not
surprisingly, the leading concern among the world business leaders at the
past Davos World Economic Forum was income inequality.5 5
As income became concentrated, it became especially concentrated in
46.

ALLEGRETTO, supra note 10, at 2.

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 2.

51.

ORG.

FOR ECON.

CO-OPERATION &

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/56/41494435.pdf

DEV.,

ARE WE

GROWING

UNEQUAL?

7 (2008),

("Taking the analysis of persistence of income

poverty and mobility of earnings between generations together suggests that more unequal countries are

prone to developing an 'underclass' who are poor themselves for long periods and so are their
children."). See also Miles Corak, Do Poor Children Become Poor Adults? Lessons from a Cross
Country Comparison of Generational Earnings Mobility (Inst. for the Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion
Paper No. 1993, 2006), available at http://ftp.iza.org/dpl993.pdf; Markus Jantti et al., American
Exceptionalism in a New Light. A Comparison of Intergenerational Earnings Mobility in the Nordic
Countries, the United Kingdom and the United States 27 (Inst. for the Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion

Paper No. 1938, 2006), available at http://ftp.iza.org/dpl938.pdf.
52.

Julia B. Isaacs, Economic Mobility of Families Across Generations, in GETTING AHEAD OR

LOSING GROUND: ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN AMERICA 19 (2008).

53.

Id.

54.
55.

Peter York, Dictators of Taste, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2012, at 1.
Gillian Tett & John Gapper, Income Disparity Heads List of Concerns, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 26,

2012, at 7.
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the financial services industries. The financial services industries command
a high share of gross domestic product ("GDP") and overall corporate
profits. 56 The profits of the financial sector and other sectors historically
grew the same rate; between 1980 and 2005, however, the financial sector's
profits increased 800 percent, whereas other sectors grew 250 percent.
Between 2001 and 2010, average compensation in the finance sector was
70 to 90 percent higher than in other industries: for those in investment
banking and securities dealing, their average compensation was 300 to 450
percent higher.5 8 In 1989, the chief executives at the seven largest bank
holding companies "earned an average of $2.8 million, or 97 times the
median U.S. household income of $28,906 for that year." By 2007, the
CEOs at the six largest bank holding companies "earned an average of $26
million, or 516 times the [2007] median household income of $50,233,"
and "2.3 times the average total compensation of the CEOs at the top 50
nonbank companies." 59
The financial services industries became highly concentrated after the
1980s-1990s merger wave. 60 Today, six bank holding companiesCitigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Goldman
Sachs, and Morgan Stanley-dominate the industry. In the third quarter of
2010, the assets of these six bank holding companies were worth 64 percent
of GDP-higher than in 2006 (about 55 percent of GDP) and 1995 (17
percent of GDP). 61 As one point of comparison, the combined assets of all
commercial banks in 1978 were worth 53 percent of GDP. 62 The four
largest U.S. commercial banking firms (Bank of America, Wells Fargo,
JPMorgan Chase, and Citigroup) account for 34 percent of national
deposits63 and 56.6 percent of the market in general purpose credit card
purchase volume; they originated 58.2 percent of mortgage loans by
volume in 2009 and serviced 56.3 percent of such loans. 64 But the larger
56.
FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 110 (2011) ("With the
exception of the recent recession, finance accounted for 25 percent to 50 percent of all corporate profits

over the past decade.").
57.

SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE

NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 60 (2010).

58.

FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 56, at 110.

59.

Id. at 110-11.

60.
See infra text accompanying note 104.
61.
Simon Johnson, The Bill Daley Problem, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 9, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/simon-johnson/bill-daley-obama-chief-of-staff b 806341.html.
62.
JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 57, at 59.
63.
As a point of reference, the twenty-five largest banks accounted for 29.1 percent of deposits
in 1980. STEPHEN A. RHOADES, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs., BANK MERGERS AND

BANKING STRUCTURE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980-98, at 26 (2000).
64.
FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING
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issue, as the next section addresses, is the separation of risk and reward for
these institutions deemed "too big and too integral to fail."
B. CONCERNS OVER CONCENTRATED ECONOMIC POWER TODAY
Few trust businesses to do what is right. But, in many countries, even
fewer trust their governments. 65 The crisis in capitalism also reflects a
crisis in confidence in the government. This is understandable. Once power
and wealth are concentrated, economic power translates into political
power, and governmental policies are directed to preserve the status quo. 66
In the late 1800s, dominant firms enlisted the government to protect
their market power with high tariffs.67 The McKinley Tariff of 1890 was
enacted the same year as the Sherman Act. On average, it increased tariff
rates by nearly 50 percent for many American products. 68 The tariffs
protected the domestic monopolies and cartels from competition, and
helped transfer income from consumers to producers. 69 As Jeffrey A.

Frieden observed, "the growth of the Sugar Trust, the Steel Trust, and other
oligopolistic combines would have been impossible without America's
high tariff barriers."70
Today, corporations and trade groups spend billions of dollars
lobbying the government.7 1 Lobbying makes economic sense since it can
CONCENTRATION LIMITS ON LARGE FINANCIAL COMPANIES 13, 24 (2011). See also SANDERS, supra

note 6, at 37-38; Stefania Vitali, James B. Glattfelder & Stefano Battiston, The Network of Global
Corporate Control, PLOS ONE, Oct. 2011, at 1, 4 (finding inequality of control among transnational
corporations to be even greater than the inequality of household income: the 737 top firms in 2007
controlled 80 percent of the value of all transnational corporations); Andy Coghlan & Debora
MacKenzie, Revealed - The Capitalist Network that Runs the World, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 24, 2011,
available at http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21228354.500-revealed-the-capitalist-networkthat-runs-the-world.html ("In effect, less than 1 per cent of the companies were able to control 40 per
cent of the entire network") (quoting James B. Glattfelder) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65.

EDELMAN, 2012 EDELMAN TRUST BAROMETER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2-3 (2012), available

at http://trust.edelman.com/trust-downloadlexecutive-summary/
(43 percent of surveyed U.S.
executives trust the government to do what is right versus 50 percent who trust businesses to do what is
right; 53 percent do not trust government leaders to tell the truth; 38 percent do not trust business
leaders to tell the truth).
66.

JEFFREY A. FRIEDEN, GLOBAL

CAPITALISM: ITS FALL AND

RISE IN THE TWENTIETH

CENTURY 102 (2006); Darren Bush, Too Big to Bail: The Role of Antitrust in Distressed Industries, 77

ANTITRUST L.J. 277, 286 (2010); HOFSTADTER, supra note 29, at 208.
67. FRIEDEN, supra note 66, at 64-65.
68.
The Tariff Bill Passed: Only Three Republican Senators Vote Nay, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
1890; Andrew Glass, This Day in Politics: McKinley Tariff Imposed, Oct. 1, 1890, POLITICO, Oct. 1,
2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0909/27768.html.
69. FRIEDEN, supra note 66, at 66.
70. Id.
71. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 57, at 90-92, 179, 192 ("As of October 2009, 1,537
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affect outcomes. 72 The Supreme Court worsened the situation when it
substantially weakened the limitations on corporate political spending, and
thereby vastly increased the importance of pleasing large donors to win
elections. 73

The taxpayer bailouts of the major financial institutions, automobile
manufacturers, the insurer AIG, and other large corporations exposed how
the economically powerful have every desire to use the government to
protect their economic interests. 74 As Frank Pasquale observed,
[Occupy Wall Street] points to a fundamental problem in today's
economy: a finance class that has used connections and power, rather
than hard work and productivity, to make a fortune.... It is crony
capitalism at its worst, a mockery of the ideals that supposedly animate
its defenders. 75
Today, the six largest financial institutions are "too big and too
integral to fail" ("TBTF"). Ironically, as a result of mergers during the
financial crisis, they became even bigger, 76 and the industry became more
concentrated as nonbank mortgage lenders exited. The six institutions
have paid financial penalties, but likely will avoid significant punishment
lobbyists representing financial institutions, other businesses, and industry groups had registered to
work on financial regulation proposals before Congress-outnumbering by twenty-five to one the

lobbyists representing consumer groups, unions, and other supporters of stronger regulation."); D.
Daniel Sokol, The Strategic Use ofPublic and Private Litigation in Antitrust as Business Strategy, 85 S.

CAL. L. REV. 689, 727-30 (2012); Maurice E. Stucke, Crony Capitalism and Antitrust (Univ. of Tenn.
Knoxville Coll. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 164, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1942045;
Ctr.
for
Responsive
Politics,
Lobbying
Database,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ (last updated Aug. 14, 2012).

72.

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 965 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part); SANDERS, supra note 6, at 219-23. Regulators may not require much

persuasion if they share the industry's biases and beliefs. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 57, at 93, 150
(observing how in the banking industry "regulatory capture is most effective when regulators share the
worldview and the preferences of the industry they supervise").
73.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
74.
SANDERS, supra note 6, at 29-33.
75.
Frank Pasquale, The Conservatism of Occupy Wall Street, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Oct. 27,
2011, 10:37 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/10/the-conservatism-of-occupywall-street.html#more-51893.
76.
Richard W. Fisher, President and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of Dall., Two Areas of Present
Concern: The Economic Outlook and the Pathology of Too-Big-to-Fail (with Reference to Errol Flynn,
Johnny
Mercer,
Gary
Stern
and
Voltaire)
(July
23,
2009),
available
at

http://www.dallasfed.org/news/speeches/fisher/2009/fsO9O723.cfm ("Bank of America's assets grew 51
percent from June 2007 to March 2009, assisted in no small part by its acquisitions of Countrywide

Financial and Merrill. Wells Fargo's asset base grew 138 percent, thanks mainly to its acquisition of
Wachovia. J.P. Morgan Chase acquired both Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual and grew 43
percent.").
77.
JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 57, at 159-64, 171, 180.
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for their misrepresentations, subprime mortgages, and high credit card
interest fees and rates.7 8
Although some disagree, 79 TBTF is an antitrust issue. First,
competition cannot be characterized as robust when four banks control 34
percent of national deposits, account for over half of the general purpose
credit card purchase volume, and originate and service more than one of
every two mortgages in America.8 0
Second, TBTF firms distort market competition and raise entry
barriers. If a firm, overconfident in its risk assessment models, seeks more
leverage, then ideally industry regulators, creditors, and shareholders
prevent such overleveraging. But if the firm is deemed TBTF, the dynamics
change. The firm has greater incentive (and freedom) to take excessive

risks." Shareholders and creditors know of the firm's implicit government
guarantee, and will not punish this risk taking: if the risky investments

work in the firm's favor, they benefit. If the risky investments fail, the
government's implicit guarantee forecloses the possibility of market exit. 82
The government guarantee itself has value in reducing the firm's borrowing
costs. 83 The TBTF firms thus enjoy a significant competitive advantage
over smaller rivals, which can fail. 84 Smaller firms cannot undertake such
risk and profit when the bets pay off. Without a government guarantee, the
smaller firms incur higher costs to borrow money. So, smaller banks have a
78.
SANDERS, supra note 6, at 182; Otmar Issing, Too Big to Fail Undermines the Free Market
System, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2012, at 11; Edward Wyatt, S.E.C. Is Avoiding Tough Sanctions for Large
Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012, at Al; George Osborne, It's a Crisis of Confidence, Not of

Capitalism, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2012, http://ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/885dea04-477e-1lel-b646-00144fea
bdcO.html#axzz26s7psWlp ("It was incredibly short-sighted, even stupid, of banks to pay bonuses in
2009 when taxpayers had only months earlier spent vast sums bailing them out and propping up the
whole sum. It was a reward for failure, which undermined a central premise of free markets.").
79.
See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, Financial Regulation and the Current Crisis: A Guide for the
Antitrust Community, in ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, COMPETITION AS PUBLIC POLICY 65 (C.

Compton et al. eds. 2010); Barak Y. Orbach & Grace E. Campbell, The Antitrust Curse of Bigness, 85

S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 651-53 (2012); D. Daniel Sokol & James A. Fishkin, Antitrust Merger
Efficiencies in the Shadow ofthe Law, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 45, 68-69 (2011).
80.
SANDERS, supra note 6, at 188.
81.
JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 57, at 204.

82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 205 (estimating large banks' paying 0.78 percentage points less for money than small

banks); FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 56, at 109 (noting that credit rating agencies

"factor an explicit 'uplift"' into the ratings of financial institutions perceived TBTF, which "increased
dramatically in 2008 and persists," but that markets factoring the ratings may not uplift into their

evaluation of these companies' long-term debt, which means that the uplift provides "a direct benefit
for the short-term funding rating for these firms" in accessing short-term wholesale funding markets
that they would be unable to access with a lower rating).
84.
Fisher, supra note 76.
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significant incentive to merge so that they too become too big and too
integral to fail.
Some argue that governmental subsidies pervade our economy. But
the competitive distortion here arises primarily from mergers to TBTF. In
any merger, the government must assess whether the merger's effect "may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 85 If
the courts and enforcers consider only the merger's claimed efficiencies
and not all the political, social, and economic costs arising from mergers to
TBTF, their review is woefully incomplete. 86 As former Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan, among others, recommended, "If they're too
big to fail, they're too big. ... In 1911 we broke up Standard Oil-so what
happened? The individual parts became more valuable than the whole.
Maybe that's what we need to do."8
III. WHATEVER HAPPENED TO ANTITRUST?
Antitrust policy historically sought to prevent the concentration of
economic power. 88 Before the rise of the Chicago School's neoclassical
economic theories, antitrust considered the social, moral, political, and
distributional ramifications of firm size upon the economy and distrusted
the concentration of economic wealth.8 9 Despite the Sherman Act's
inconsistent enforcement over the past century, it embodied at least a
competitive ideal of curbing the concentration of economic power and
serving as the last obstacle to complete industrial autocracy. 90 President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, for example, observed that cartels and monopolies
flourished in pre-war Germany because of the absence of antitrust laws and
a lack of popular distrust of the concentration of power and monopolies. 9 1
To

prevent

concentrated

economic

power,

the

antitrust

laws

85.

15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).

86.

Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM.

ECON. REV. 18, 24, 28-32 (1968).
87.
Michael McKee & Scott Lanman, Greenspan Says U.S. Should Consider Breaking Up Large
Banks, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 15, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email en&sid=aJ8HP

niNUfchg.
88.
HOFSTADTER, supra note 29, at 200, 205 ("[T]he Sherman Act was simply another
manifestation of an enduring American suspicion of concentrated power.").
89.
Maurice E. Stucke, ReconsideringAntitrust's Goals, 53 B.C. L. REv. 551, 555-57 (2012).
90.
HOFSTADTER, supra note 29, at 195.
91.
Wilhelm Cohnstaedt, Germany's Cartels and State Control:A Revealing Study of the Reich 's
Post-War Industrial Monopoly Organizations, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1935, at BR9; John H. Crider,
Roosevelt Calls for Cartels Curb: In Letter to Hull He Says Types of "Trusts" Used by Reich Must Be

Ended, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1944, at 1.
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historically believed in maintaining competitive market structures, rather

than regulatory dictates. 92 As Alfred Kahn wrote, the "essential task of
public policy in a free enterprise system should be to preserve the
framework of a fair field and no favors, letting the results take care of

themselves." 93 By the 1960s, antitrust for some was "complex, difficult,
and boring."9 4 Although bigness was not per se illegal,95 there was strong
bipartisan support to enforce the Clayton Act with the aim of arresting
concentration in its incipiency. 96
With an emphasis on structural banking regulations 97 and antitrust
merger review, the Court in the 1960s characterized the federal supervision
of banking as one of the most, if not the most, successful systems of
economic regulation.9 8 Commercial banking at that time was diffused
through many independent, local banks, rather than concentrated in a few
nationwide banks, as in England and Germany. 99 Commercial banking was
subject to various state and federal governmental controls. 00 Add to that
antitrust merger review, which, consistent with the legislative intent of the
1950 amendments to the Clayton Act, sought to arrest anticompetitive
tendencies and trends toward concentration in their incipiency. 101 The
Court noted the "virtual disappearance of bank failures from the American
economic scene."102

Antitrust in the 1960s significantly differs from today's policies. One
positive development, over the past forty years, is that mergers' likely
efficiencies, once viewed with suspicion, are now seen as a benefit. One
negative development is the contraction of antitrust review, which
contributed to the market failure in the financial services industries.
92.
See Peter C. Carstensen, Remedies for Monopolization from Standard Oil to Microsoft and
Intel: The Changing Nature of Monopoly Law from Elimination of Market Power to Regulation of Its
Use, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 815, 816-17 (2012).
93.
Alfred E. Kahn, Standardsfor Antitrust Policy, 67 HARV. L. REV. 28, 39 (1953).
94.
HOFSTADTER, supra note 29, at 189.

95.

See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945).

96.

STANLEY

N.

BARNES

&

S. CHESTERFIELD

OPPENHEIM,

THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL'S

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 117 (1955); Allen P. Grunes & Maurice E.
Stucke, Antitrust Review of the AT&T/T-Mobile Transaction, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 47, 55-60 (2011)
(discussing incipiency standard).

97.

See, e.g., Glass-Steagall Act, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (restricting, among

other things, commercial banks from engaging principally in investment banking activities).

98.
99.

United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
Id. at 325.

100.
JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 57, at 34-36.
101.
Phila. Nat' Bank, 374 U.S. at 363.
102.
Id. at 329; JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 57, at 36 (providing figures on annual bank
suspensions and failures).
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Antitrust policy historically distrusted the concentration of economic
power. After the Chicago School, however, even monopolies were
characterized as beneficial. 103
With lax merger review and banking deregulation, beginning in the
1980s, the financial services industry underwent a wave of record-setting
mega-mergers. 104 Around four hundred to five hundred banks each year
between 1986 and 1998 ceased to exist independently.10 5 As the financial
sector became more concentrated, by the 1990s, the U.S. Department of
Justice's Antitrust Division ("DOT") no longer considered trends of
concentration and arresting competitive problems in their incipiency.
Instead, the DOJ typically examined the bank merger's anticompetitive
risks with respect to the exercise of market power in narrowly defined
geographic markets. Focusing on short-term static price competition (such
as whether the banks postmerger may raise rates for specific categories of
borrowers in particular cities), the DOJ did not consider market trends and
the merger's impact on the efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of the
overall financial system.
Consequently, in the $70 billion merger of Travelers Group, Inc. and
Citicorp in the 1990s, the United States heard numerous complaints that
Citigroup would have an undue aggregation of resources and that the deal
would create a firm too big to be allowed to fail. 106 In dismissing these
concerns, the Federal Reserve and DOJ saw no evidence of how the size or
breadth of Citicorp's activities would allow it to distort or dominate price
competition in any narrowly defined antitrust market; the Federal Reserve
103.

Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV.

497 (criticizing Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 412
(2004)).
104.

JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 57, at 59, 64-87, 89; STEPHEN A. RHOADES, BD. OF

GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs., BANK MERGERS AND INDUSTRY-WIDE STRUCTURE, 1980-94,

at 3 (1996) (finding that an average of 190 bank mergers annually between 1960 and 1982); RHOADES,
supra note 63, at 3 (finding that an average of 420 bank mergers annually between 1980 and 1998, for a

total of about 8000 mergers-"equal to about 55 percent of all banks in existence in 1980"); Robert
Kramer, Chief, Litig. II Section, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, "Mega-Mergers" in the Banking
Industry (Apr. 14, 1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/214845.pdf ("[A]

number of individual mergers during the 1990's ranked among the largest U.S. bank mergers ever, in
terms of the real value of assets involved, and in terms of the share of total U.S. bank assets accounted
for by the merging banks."). JPMorgan Chase, for example, came from mergers involving eleven
financial institutions, Bank of America from thirteen institutions, and Wells Fargo from nine
institutions. How Banks
Got Too Big to Fail, MOTHER JONES, Jan. / Feb. 2010,
http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/01/bank-merger-history.
105.
RHOADES, supra note 63, at 25.
106.
Maurice E. Stucke, Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 313, 318-20

(2010).
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firmly believed the federal agencies had extensive experience in developing
a comprehensive, risk-based supervision plan to effectively monitor
Citibank. 107

IV. CURRENT ANTITRUST PARADOXES
Antitrust policy currently suffers several paradoxes. One paradox is
that despite the quest for a single economic goal, U.S. antitrust policy today
lacks any clear unifying goal. Competition officials can agree that
prohibiting certain egregiously anticompetitive behavior (such as pricefixing) promotes their goal (whether it is consumer welfare, efficiency, or
economic freedom). But these restraints were condemned when antitrust
recognized multiple social, political, and economic goals.
A second paradox is that the Supreme Court of late has complained
about the state of antitrust litigation (for example, the interminable
litigation, inevitably costly and protracted discovery phase, and its fear
over the unusually high risk of inconsistent results by lower courts), but the
Court itself has created this predicament. 108 Over the past thirty years, the
Court increasingly relied on its fact-specific weighing standard, the rule of
reason, and a vague economic goal (consumer welfare) that accommodated
different personal values and interpretation, and often pointed to no
particular course of action.
A third paradox is, as Eleanor Fox describes, the efficiency paradox:

"by trusting dominant firm strategies and leading firm collaborations to
produce efficiency, modern U.S. antitrust protects monopoly and oligopoly,

suppresses

innovative

challenges,

and

stifles

efficiency."1 09

While

recognizing dynamic competition as more important, antitrust agencies and

courts have "tended to avoid dynamic efficiency analysis," focusing instead
on a static price competition and productive efficiencies.1 10 Courts and
antitrust agencies applied a light touch to merger review under a fear of
false positives and a belief that most mergers promote efficiencies, even
though the empirical literature suggests the contrary." While recognizing
107.
Id.
108.
See generally Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1375 (2009) (collecting and discussing many of the criticisms of the rule of reason).
109.
Eleanor M. Fox, The Efficiency Paradox, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE
MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMiC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 77 (Robert Pitofsky

ed., 2008).
110.
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., POLICY BRIEF: MERGERS AND DYNAMIC
EFFICIENCIES 4 (2008), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/48/41359037.pdf.
111.
Id. at 6; Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527,

1560-61 (2011).
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an efficiencies defense, antitrust enforcers and courts did not account for
postmerger inefficiencies or the competitive distortions in creating TBTF
firms.112

A fourth paradox is the economic power paradox. Our constitutional
framework seeks to distribute power, rather than promote its concentration.
Despite the historical concerns about concentrated economic power,
antitrust enforcers and courts over the past thirty years "no longer
concern[ed] themselves with preventing bigness, and indeed tend[ed]
instead to encourage large-scale enterprise for efficiency's sake." 113 While
we saw in nature the benefits of diversity, 114 we disregarded in one of our
more important industries, the financial services markets, the dangers of
concentration and systemic risk.1 15 Despite the public and governmental
concern about protecting small businesses from unfair competitive tactics,
and the importance of small companies in promoting dynamic efficiencies,
the Verizon CommunicationsInc. v. Law Offices of Cutis V. Trinko, LLP 16
Court praised monopolies.
A fifth paradox is that while trust, fairness, and prosocial behavior are
vital to the functioning of a market economy,117 antitrust policy ignores
these values and views market participants as amoral self-interested profitmaximizers.1

A sixth antitrust paradox, observed Jesse Markham, is that the
government's "laissez-faire policies" over the past thirty years "led to
unprecedented government intervention in the private sector." 119
112.
Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Lessons for Competition Law from the Economic Crisis: The
Prospectfor Antitrust Responses to the "Too-Big-To-Fail"Phenomenon, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.

L. 261, 314 (2011).
113.
Id. at 264.
114.
Thomas J. Horton, The Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and the Eclipse of the
Chicago School of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology to Structural and Behavioral Antitrust

Analyses, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 469, 485 (2011).
115. Id. at 491.
116. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004)
("The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not
only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system.").
117.
LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: How GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 19

(2011).
118.
Reeves & Stucke, supra note 111, at 1536-38; Maurice E. Stucke, Money, Is That What I
Want? Competition Policy & the Role of Behavioral Economics, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 893, 899-

901 (2010).
119.

Markham, supra note 112, at313.
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V. CONCLUSION
The concerns in Standard Oil resonate today. One would expect
Occupy Wall Street protesters to question current antitrust policies. But

antitrust's relevancy has declined since the 1970s. As one example,
antitrust, other than a savings clause, 120 is absent in the 2010 Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which ostensibly seeks
to promote financial stability by improving accountability and transparency
in the financial system, to end "too big to fail," to protect the American
taxpayer by ending bailouts, and to protect consumers from abusive
financial services practices.
The vested interests have little incentive to change the status quo. As
Frieden described of the plantation societies in Latin America and the

American South, their governments "were rarely willing or able to
encourage the socioeconomic development-of infrastructure, finance, and
education-needed to allow the productive forces of the society as a whole

to be brought to bear." 12 1
But if competition is more a political than economic concept, then one
promising note is the business literature. After the financial crisis, business

scholars

are

reconsidering

capitalism,

"one

imbued with a

social

122

purpose."
In the past, the concepts of sustainability, fairness, and
profitability generally were seen as conflicting. 123 But these concepts are
seen as reinforcing under the principle of shared value, which "involves
creating economic value for society by addressing its needs and

challenges" and enhances "the competitiveness of a company while
simultaneously advancing the economic and social conditions in the
communities in which it operates." 124 Profits can be attained not through
exploitation (for example, creating demand for harmful or useless
products), but through collaboration and trust and in better helping
consumers solve their problems. Sustainability, rather than a cost,
represents an opportunity for companies to improve productivity and
societal welfare.
120.

12 U.S.C. § 5303 (2012).

121.
FRIEDEN, supra note 66, at 102.
122.
Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent Capitalism
and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 77. See also
Dominic Barton, Capitalismfor the Long Term, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar. 2011; Rosabeth Moss Kanter,
How Great Companies Think Differently, HARv. Bus. REv., Nov. 2011, at 66; Symposium, Conscious
Capitalism, 53 CAL. MGMT. REv. 60 (2011).
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Porter & Kramer, supra note 122, at 64.
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So capitalism is in crisis. But the Occupy Wall Street protesters, like
many Americans, are not seeking socialism or totalitarianism. 125 Instead,
they want to redefine capitalism to one imbued with a moral purpose,
whereby they use their talents for the betterment of others.
125.

Occupy London, How Hayek Helped Us to Find Capitalism'sFlaws, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 26,

2012, at 11.

